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UNPACKING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE:  A JOURNEY INTO FOREIGN 
TERRITORY 
 
E van der Schyff* 
 
I keep six honest serving men (they taught me all I knew); 
Their names are What and Why and When and How and Where and Who. 
Rudyard Kipling, The Elephant's Child 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The past decade has borne witness to the transformation of South Africa's natural 
resources law with the introduction of a new legal concept to South African 
jurisprudence.  The table for transformation was set with Section 3 of the National 
Water Act,1 in which the concept of "public trusteeship" was formally introduced into 
South African law without great fanfare.  Then followed the National Environmental 
Management Act,2 the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act3 and the 
National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act,4 each ingraining this novel 
concept of "public trusteeship" more firmly into South African jurisprudence.  With the 
promulgation of these pieces of legislation, the state has had conferred upon it the 
obligation to act as either trustee or custodian of the environment or a specific 
natural resource, whilst the environment or that particular natural resource has been 
bequeathed to the people of South Africa. 
 
In the quest to demystify the incorporation of the concept of "public trusteeship" in 
South Africa, this article, as a first tentative step, proposes focusing solely on the 
public trust doctrine as it functions in American jurisprudence.  It is the aim of the 
article to give a thorough theoretical exposition of the development and application of 
the public trust doctrine in American jurisprudence in order to provide the South 
                                                     
*  Elmarie van der Schyff.  BA LLB LLM LLD (NWU).  Associate Professor in Law, North-West 
University, South Africa (Elmarie.VanderSchyff@nwu.ac.za).  Soli Deo gratia. A note of gratitude 
to all my colleagues who were burdened with reading the first drafts of this work and, in 
particular, Profs Gerrit Pienaar, Andre van der Walt and Hanri Mostert, for their valuable 
comments. 
1  36 of 1998. 
2  107 of 1998. 
3  28 of 2002. 
4  10 of 2004. 
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African scholar with a perspective on a legal construct founded on the philosophical 
notion that governments exercise a "fiduciary trust" on behalf of their people.   
 
The concept of "public trusteeship", as it is embodied in South African legislation, 
encapsulates the sovereign's duty to act as guardian of certain interests to the 
benefit of the nation as a whole.  This concept is founded securely in legal 
philosophy.  Locke stated in his Second Treatise on Civil Government5 (1685) that 
governments merely exercise a "fiduciary trust" on behalf of their people.  Pound6 
suggests that the role of states in the management of common natural resources 
must be limited to "a sort of guardianship for social purposes" and Marx7 voices the 
opinion that: 
 
From the standpoint of a higher socio-economic formation, the private 
property of particular individuals in the earth will appear just as absurd as 
private property of one man in other men.  Even an entire society, a nation, 
or all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not owners of the 
earth.  They are simply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to 
bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding generations as boni patres 
familias. 
 
Through the concept of "public trusteeship", a stewardship ethic has been 
incorporated into South African natural resources law.8 
 
It is important to realise that public trusteeship is more that the embodiment of a 
philosophical thought.  It is a concept that forms the core of respectable foreign legal 
constructs.  In this regard, one can refer to the Anglo-American public trust doctrine, 
the notion found in French jurisprudence in which a clear distinction is made 
between le domain public and propriété (private ownership), and the concept 
applicable in German jurisprudence in which a "certain category of property can be 
removed from the sphere of private property altogether"9 or in which "a certain 
category of property rights can be transformed into public-law rights for the sake of 
                                                     
5 Chp 11, S 139 Locke 1690 http://bit.ly/D1Fvi.  See Dunn "The concept of trust in the politics of 
John Locke" in this regard. 
6 Pound Introduction 111. 
7 Marx Capital 911.  This passage is frequently quoted.  See, inter alia, Foster 2006 AJS 385; 
Foster 2002 http://bit.ly/huO54l. 
8 Brady 1990 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 633. 
9 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause 130. 
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more effective control".10  All of these are examples of legal constructs founded on a 
variation of the same philosophy – that in some defined instances, governments act 
solely as guardians or custodians on behalf of the people they represent.  Although 
based on the same philosophical foundation, the application and consequences of 
each of these foreign legal constructs differ substantially. 
 
Therefore, it would be much too simplistic to summarily equate public trusteeship as 
it is found in South African legislation with  the embodiment of either a philosophical 
idea or a complicated foreign legal doctrine.  The mystery that surrounds the concept 
of "public trusteeship", as it has been introduced through legislation into South 
African jurisprudence, demands that it be unravelled in the course of time.  This 
process will necessitate comparative analysis and innovative thinking, but it is a 
process in which we shall inevitably have to engage, for the incorporation of the 
concept of "public trusteeship" has profoundly influenced property theory and the law 
of property in particular, given that the notion challenges the known concepts of 
"ownership" and "property" in South African jurisprudence.  In the South African 
context, the way in which any "thing" can belong to the "nation" or the "people of 
South Africa" must firstly be determined, should neither the nation nor the "people of 
South Africa" be entities (or an entity) clothed with legal personality enabling them to 
acquire or hold property.  Whilst South African courts have referred to "the State 
fulfilling its role as custodian holding the environment in public trust for the people",11 
there has been no attempt in reported cases to give a thorough exposition of the 
notion.   
 
                                                     
10 BVerfGE 58, 300 (339) 15 July 1981 1 BvL 77/78 (Naßauskiesung case). 
11 Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts Products 2004 1 All 
SA 636 (E) 658.  See also De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd Case 
3215/06 (unreported).  
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This article intends to give an account of the historical development and application 
of the public trust doctrine in American jurisprudence with specific reference to the 
nature and scope of the doctrine, whilst highlighting the consequences of the 
application of the doctrine for both environmental and property law. 
 
2  The American public trust doctrine 
 
The modern public trust doctrine is controversial and complex.12  It has been hailed 
as the ultimate environmental protection tool by many ecologists and 
environmentalists,13 yet others have criticised it.14  Some perceive the doctrine as 
ground-breaking, yet others feel it destroys the basic fabric of property law.15 
 
As a distinction is made in literature between the traditional public trust doctrine and 
the modern public trust doctrine, the discussion begins with a brief view of the 
traditional public trust doctrine and the legal nature of the doctrine, and then 
describes the public trust doctrine as a contemporary legal construct. 
 
2.1 The traditional public trust doctrine 
 
2.1.1 The essence of the traditional public trust doctrine 
 
The public trust doctrine was developed in the American legal system in response to 
the desire to determine the ownership of the beds of navigable waters.16  It was the 
product of an effort to reconcile the opposing concepts of "common ownership", 
                                                     
12 Wilkinson 1989 Envtl L 425; Kearney and Merrill 2004 U Chi L Rev 800. 
13 Brooks et al Law and Ecology 182; Blumm 1989 Envtl L 573; Scott 1998 Fordham Envtl LJ 3. 
14 Lazarus 1986 Iowa L Rev 656–691; Huffman 1986 Denv U L Rev 583, who describes the public 
trust doctrine as a "tool for political losers or for those seeking to avoid the costs of becoming 
political winners". 
15 Scott 1998 Fordham Envtl LJ 4; Kearney and Merrill 2004 U Chi L Rev 800. 
16 Stevens 1980 UC Davis LR 200. 
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dating back as far as the Roman Empire,17 and the development of the notion that 
virtually everything has an owner.18 
 
The public trust doctrine essentially recognises that certain public uses ought to be 
specifically protected.19  It entails the distinction between private title and public 
rights and recognises that the state, as sovereign, acts as trustee of public rights in 
certain natural resources.20 As such, the public trust doctrine embodies the 
arguments of Marx, Pound and Locke referred to in the introduction of this article. 
 
The legal consequences of applying this line of thought to a legal system culminated 
in the drawing of a distinction between property that could be owned privately or 
granted to private entities and property incapable of ordinary and private occupation, 
                                                     
17 Fernandez 1998 Alb L Rev 627 states that the Roman concepts of "common property" and 
"public rights" were incorporated by the English into both the Magna Charta and the English 
common law.  Coquillette 1979 Cornell L Rev 800 names the public trust doctrine the res 
communes doctrine.  See also Scott 1998 Fordham Envtl LJ 24–36 and Sax 1980 UC Davis LR 
185. 
18 Stevens 1980 UC Davis LR 195,197–198. 
19 Martin v Waddell's Lessee 41 US 367 (Pet) (1842) – hereafter Martin; Illinois Central Railroad 
Company v Illinois 146 US 387 (1892) – hereafter Illinois Central.  Cognisance must be taken of 
the fact that Arnold v Mundy 6 NJL 1 (1821) – hereafter Arnold – is another leading case in public 
trust law.  In this case, an American court formulated the traditional public trust doctrine.  In the 
1988 Supreme Court decision of Phillips Petroleum Company v Mississippi 484 US 469 (1988) 
473 (hereafter Phillips Petroleum Company), the court expressed the view that Shively v Bowlby 
152 US 1 (1894) – hereafter Shively – is in fact the seminal case in American public trust 
jurisprudence.  The Shively case rested on prior decisions of the US Supreme Court, eg the 
Illinois Central case and Knight v United States Land Association 142 US 161 (1891) – hereafter 
Knight. 
 Different writers have defined the public trust doctrine subjectively, but the essence of the 
doctrine boils down to the protection of certain public uses.  Casey 1984 Nat Resources J 812 
defines the public trust doctrine as the right of the individual state to regulate and control its 
navigable waters and the lands underlying them on behalf of its citizens' interests in certain 
public uses, namely navigation, commerce and fisheries.   Sax 1980 UC Davis LR 188–189 
describes the central idea of the public trust doctrine as: 
 
[P]reventing the destabilising disappointment of expectations held in common but without 
formal recognition such as title.  The function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to 
protect such public expectations against destabilising changes, just as we protect 
conventional private property from such changes. 
 
 According to Lazarus 1986 Iowa L Rev 633, "the historical function of the public trust doctrine 
has been to provide a public property basis for resisting the exercise of private property rights in 
natural resources deemed contrary to the public interest".  Searle 1990 SC L Rev 898 concisely 
describes the concept as "state ownership of property held exclusively for the benefit of and use 
by the general public".  Rasband 1998 U Colo L Rev 331 holds that the doctrine described the 
state's fiduciary responsibilities with respect to land under navigable water and certain associated 
resources.  See also Williams 2002 SC Envtl LJ 31. 
20 Glass v Goeckel 473 Mich 667 (2005) 673 – hereafter Glass. 
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reserved to be accessed by and used to the benefit of the public.21  Because certain 
interests such as navigation and fishing were sought to be preserved for the benefit 
of public use in the early American society, property used for those purposes was 
distinguished from public property.  The latter could be granted to private owners by 
the sovereign.22  The former was subject to the state's dominium and could not be 
relinquished.23  Initially, only land covered by tidal waters was subject to the 
protection of the doctrine.24  Gradually, the geographical reach of the doctrine was 
extended25 to cover all navigable waters and the land beneath them, without 
reducing the scope of the public trust in tidelands.26   
 
Although states could exercise their dominium only in a way that would ensure 
freedom in the use of property subject to the doctrine – a use consistent with the 
public interest – the use of lands subject to the public trust doctrine could be 
modified or altered.  Any modification of existing use was permissible as long as the 
public interest was not substantially impaired.27  In both the Martin and Shively 
cases, it was held that since the suit property was held in trust for the public, 
property clothed with this perpetual public right of user could not easily be alienated 
                                                     
21 Shively case.  
22 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 476. 
23 It is stated in the Knight case 183 that it is the settled rule of law in this court that absolute 
property in, and dominium and sovereignty over, the soils under the tidewaters in the original 
states were reserved to the several states, and that the new states since admitted have the same 
rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction in that behalf as the original states possess within their 
respective borders. 
 
 In the Shively case 11–12, Justice Gray explained the common law perspective on the nature of 
the sovereign's claim when dealing with navigable waters and the sea: 
 
Such waters, and the land which they cover, either at all times, or at least when the tide is 
in, are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation, and improvement; and 
their natural and primary uses are public in their nature … Therefore the title, jus privatum, 
in such lands … belongs to the king, as the sovereign; and the dominium thereof, jus 
publicum, is vested in him, as the representative of the nation for the public benefit. 
 
 See also the Illinois Central case 452. 
24 The "public common of piscary" is included in the dominium of navigable water.  It is stated in the 
Illinois Central case 436 that the English notion of dominium and ownership by the crown of land 
within the realm under tidewaters were equated with the requirement of navigability. 
25 In the Illinois Central case, the court confirmed the principle stated in The Propeller Genesee 
Chief v Fitzhugh 12 How 443 (1852) 457 and Barney v City of Keokuk 94 US 324 (1877) 338, 
extending the doctrine to waters that were non-tidal but navigable. 
26 This statement is in principle supported in California Earth Corps v California State Lands 
Commission 27 Cal Rptr 3d 476 (2005) 480, in which the court stated in 2005:  "Though the rule 
applies generally to all navigable waters, it had its first application to tidelands." 
27 Illinois Central case 452. 
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by the sovereign.28  Courts found that a stricter standard than usual was to be 
applied in instances in which conveyances were scrutinised.  There was a 
presumption against the sovereign's intention to part with any portion of the public 
domain, unless clear and specific words to that effect were used.29  It was also held 
that whatever title the grantee took was burdened by the public trust and would be 
read in conformity with it.30  The state lacked the power to diminish public trust rights 
when trust property was conveyed to private parties.31  Thus, when a private party 
acquired property burdened with the public trust, it acquired only the jus privatum.  
The test to determine the validity of alienation would, therefore, lie in the question of 
whether the grant was of such magnitude that the state would effectively have given 
up its authority to govern the property to protect the public's rights in the property.32 
 
Scrutiny of the traditional public trust doctrine highlights the following features:33 
 
(a) the doctrine applied to tidal and navigable waters and the soil covered by these 
waters; 
(b) original state ownership of these resources was confirmed; 
(c) this state ownership was not unrestricted but was subject to the public's right of 
use for purposes of navigation, fishing and commerce; 
(d) the uses of navigation, fishing and commerce were the only protected uses, and 
it can be inferred that it was not the broad public interest in the resources that 
was protected but the public interest in relation to these specific uses.  These 
interests were deemed protectable in accordance with the societal values of the 
era in which they originated; 
(e) public uses could be diminished or altered so long as the public interest was not 
substantially impaired; 
(f) the courts could apply public trust reasoning when scrutinising government 
dealings in connection with trust resources, and could even put an end to and 
reverse government actions not in line with the principles of the trust; and 
                                                     
28 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 476. 
29 Martin case 411; Shively case 10.  
30 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 487.  This principle is confirmed in a 2005 decision by the Supreme Court 
of Michigan in the Glass case 679. 
31 Glass case 673. 
32 Casey 1984 Nat Resources J 814. 
33 This summary is a condensation of information extracted from all the sources referred to in the 
footnotes above. 
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(g) on the rare occasions that trust property was alienated, the property received by 
the new owner would be subject to the conditions of the trust. 
 
2.1.2 The classification of the traditional public trust doctrine 
 
The classification of the "public trust" as a true legal trust has been supported and 
opposed.  On the one hand, Stevens34 suggests that American law adopted the trust 
analogy to satisfy the need to identify an owner of at least the legal title to the 
resources in which people had a common right.35  Ownership of these resources 
was then burdened with "the rule of law that public rights, and such things as are 
materially related to them, are inalienable" 36 and could consequently not be 
separated from the sovereign.  Huffman,37 on the other hand, argues convincingly 
that the use of the word "trust" in the name of the doctrine is misleading.  He 
maintains that only in the original English law formulation could the notion possibly 
be described as a trust:38 
 
In a legal regime that recognised title to waters and submerged lands in the 
King, it was possible to describe the rights held in common by the members 
of the public either as an easement or as an equitable interest in property in 
which the King had legal title.  Because the King was clearly distinct from the 
people (that is, the trustees and the beneficiary were not the same), the trust 
model is applicable.  Nevertheless, the questions of who created the trust, 
and thus its purpose, remain unanswered. 
 
In the American context, this explanation would not suffice.  To position the notion 
within the trust concept, more is needed than the mere acknowledgement that legal 
title can be said to vest in the state whilst the equitable title vests in the public.39  The 
tripartite nature of the creation and operation of trusts disqualifies the traditional 
American public trust from being classified as a true legal trust.40 
                                                     
34 Stevens 1980 UC Davis LR 195, 197–198; Huffman 1989 Envtl L 544. 
35 Bader 1992 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 751 holds the opinion that the English adopted the Roman 
principle of res omnium communes but replaced the notion of "common ownership" with that of 
"state ownership". 
36 Bracton On the Laws and Customs of England 39–40 as cited by Stevens 1980 UC Davis LR 
197. 
37 Huffman 1989 Envtl L 534. 
38 Huffman 1989 Envtl L 561. 
39 Huffman 1989 Envtl L 535. 
40 Huffman 1989 Envtl L 535, 538 points out that three parties are needed to create a trust in 
American law:  the creator or settler of the trust, the trustee and the beneficiary.  The purposes of 
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It appears that the word "trust" refers to the fiduciary responsibility of the sovereign 
rather than to the legal nature of the doctrine.  The state fulfils the duty imposed on it 
by the public trust doctrine, by honouring the restraint on alienation and protecting 
the public's right of use.  The public trust right exists not at the grace of the 
sovereign, but despite it.  In its traditional, common-law formulation, the traditional 
public trust doctrine is therefore best understood as an easement that members of 
the public hold in common.41 Drawing from the earliest origins of the public trust 
doctrine, Huffman42 indicates that the doctrine was the basis of private rather than 
public rights:  "The private rights were held in common by all members of the public, 
but they were exercised privately."  As such, it falls within the sphere of property 
law.43  
 
2.2 The modern public trust doctrine 
 
Considering the law has no life of its own and that property, like any other social 
institution, has a social function to fulfil,44 it is not remarkable to find that the 
traditional public trust doctrine has evolved into a modern public trust doctrine.  It has 
been stated that the public trust doctrine "perseveres as a value system and an ethic 
as its expression in law mutates and evolves".45 Development began once the 
doctrine's reach was expanded from tidewaters to navigable waters,46 and changing 
public needs created by growth and progress have since stimulated further 
development.  What was formerly a common-law principle has evolved into a 
modern doctrine with interests in constitutional and statutory law.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
the creator define the relationship between the parties holding legal and equitable title.  In 
attempting to determine which parties are the creator, trustee and beneficiary of the alleged trust 
of the public trust doctrine, Huffman points out that the public can be identified as the beneficiary 
and the state as the trustee.  However, a single entity cannot be both the trustee and beneficiary 
of a trust:  
  
The democratic state is the agent of the people.  It acts at the behest of the people and, 
therefore, for the benefit of the people.  The people cannot act as fiduciary, through the 
state, for themselves. 
 
 The question as to the identity of the creator can also not be answered. 
41 Huffman 1989 Envtl L 527. 
42 Huffman 1989 Envtl L 550. 
43 Coquillette 1979 Cornell L Rev 811–813; Hannig 1983 Santa Clara L Rev 211. 
44 Stevens 1980 UC Davis LR 199. 
45 Takacs 2008 NYU Envtl LJ 711. 
46 In the Shively case 20 the state’s rights in navigable water and the soil beneath it is confirmed.. 
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The development and principles underlying this development will be scrutinised in 
the following section.  The development concerns mainly the codification of the 
doctrine and the expansion of its scope.  The underlying principles described above 
remained unchanged.47  Through incorporating a wider genre of objects under the 
public trust, the doctrine has expanded to protect more than navigation and fishing 
rights from both individual exploiters and corrupt or incompetent governments.  By 
placing public trust property in a unique property regime in which it is neither 
susceptible to unlimited private ownership nor unrestricted state ownership, and by 
binding the state with the responsibility of guarding the public's interest in that 
specific object, a unique property interest was vested in each member of the public 
purported to be protected by the public trust – normally the citizens of the country. 
 
2.2.1 The development of the traditional public trust doctrine into the modern 
public trust doctrine 
 
2.2.1.1 First tentative steps towards expansion 
 
Joseph L Sax48 has widely been acknowledged as the father of the modern public 
trust doctrine.49  From the introductory comments made in his seminal work,50 it is 
clear that Sax considered the application and expansion of the public trust doctrine in 
an attempt to find one norm that could apply throughout the spectrum of 
                                                     
47 Martin case 411; Shively case 10. 
48 As a Professor of Law, first at Michigan Law School then at California, Berkeley, Sax completed 
meticulous research in the field of Public Trust Law.  His seminal work, The Public Trust Doctrine 
in Natural Resource Law: Effective in Judicial Intervention, published in 1970, sparked the usage 
and development of the public trust doctrine in American environmental law. 
49 Olson 1975 Det CLR 162 refers to Sax's seminal work as the leading treatment on the public 
trust doctrine and emphasises that Sax's article is mandatory reading for a comprehensive 
understanding of the public trust doctrine.  Huffman 1986 Denv U L Rev 566 states: "the rebirth 
and dramatic growth of the public trust doctrine is in no small part the product of a classic article 
on the subject by Jonathan Sax".  Dunning 1989 Envtl L 524 voices a more balanced opinion in 
stating that Prof Sax's work drew the attention of environmental law students to the public 
doctrine during a period of heightened public interest in environmental protection, and states that 
interest and attention have remained high amongst environmental law scholars.  Brady 1990 BC 
Envtl Aff L Rev 622.  Bader 1994 Hamline LR 52 contends that Sax resuscitated the public trust 
doctrine and applied it to modern environmental problems.  Grant 1995 Ariz St LJ 443 describes 
Sax as "the nation's leading public trust doctrine scholar".  See Araiza 1997 UCLA LR 385, 397 
and Kearney and Merrill 2004 U Chi L Rev 806. 
50 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 473. 
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environmental management problems.51  Inconsistency in legislative response and 
administrative action and the enormous disparity in legal standards, whereby 
different resource problems were managed, necessitated the search for "a broad 
legal approach which would make the opportunity to obtain effective judicial 
intervention more likely".52  In order to be an effective tool in the trade of 
environmental protection, the public trust doctrine had to possess three 
characteristics.  It had to create an obligation that could be enforceable against the 
government, it had to vest some concept of a legal right in the general public, and it 
had to be capable of being interpreted consistent with contemporary concerns for 
environmental quality.53  
 
Sax54 believed that the public trust doctrine possessed all three of the required 
attributes, and that this therefore rendered it "useful as a tool of general application 
for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource 
management problems". 
 
Sax understood the principle underlying the Roman concepts of "res omnium 
communes" and "res publicae" and valued the protection given to certain public uses 
in the English common law.  He found that those same principles underlie the 
American law of navigable waters and the sea.  The potential this doctrine held for 
environmental protection did not escape his attention.  Initially,55 Sax found 
conceptual support for the doctrine in a combination of ideas "which have floated 
rather freely in and out of American public trust law".56  The most important of these 
                                                     
51 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 474 – Sax considered the doctrine because it is apparent from earlier case 
law, eg City of Milwaukee v State 193 Wis 423 (1927) 451–452, that the doctrine existed 
specifically with reference to navigable water.  Sax merely intended to indicate that the doctrine 
could be applied to other environmental issues.  Searle 1990 SC L Rev 897 indicates that the 
doctrine was "re-discovered" in response to the twentieth century's environmental crisis. 
52 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 474.  Sax was not alone in this search.  Another article published on the 
public trust doctrine in 1970 indicates the urgency of finding a constructive tool to prevent 
environmental degradation.  Cohen 1970 ULR 388–394 states: "In order that the great increase 
of public concern for our environment may be made an effective force in protecting the 
environment, a viable legal theory which can be used by private litigants is urgently needed." 
53 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 474. 
54 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 474. 
55  Whilst Sax initially chose to describe the doctrine as not substantive and rejected the property 
rationale as too inflexible – Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 478–483 – he later described the doctrine's 
operation in terms of property rights and did not refrain from attaching substantive standards to 
judicial application of the doctrine – Sax 1980 UC Davis LR 185, 189–193.  
56 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 484.  Sax does not support the idea that the public should be viewed as a 
property holder in the same sense that an individual can be the owner of a specific tract of land.  
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theories was that "certain interests are so intrinsically important to every citizen that 
their free availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens rather than of 
serfs".57  
 
It was, therefore, unthinkable that any person could claim a private property interest 
to the detriment of the community.  A related principle was that "certain interests are 
so particularly the gifts of nature's bounty that they ought to be reserved for the 
whole of the populace".58 
 
Then there was also the recognition "that certain uses have a peculiarly public nature 
that makes their adaptation to private use inappropriate".59  Von Tigerstrom60 
indicates that the key elements in all these ideas appear to be access and 
conservation: preserving public access to important resources and conserving those 
resources for the use of the public.  The public trust concept provided a point of 
intersection for these notions.61  
 
2.2.1.2 Judicial expansion of the doctrine 
 
Olson62 is one of many commentators who argue that the public trust doctrine was 
sufficiently flexible not to be confined by traditional boundaries.  He contends that the 
doctrine could be used to protect other unique natural resources to which the public 
asserts a special claim.  He found support for his argument in the locus classicus of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
His view is explained in Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 478–483.  Coquillette 1979 Cornell L Rev 811–813 
holds a different opinion and states that the true origins of the public trust doctrine lie in a 
property doctrine, namely the res communes property doctrine.  He declines to interpret the 
public trust doctrine as a principle of administrative law and states that his approach would 
ensure greater protection for the public.  Coquillette states that res communes could well be 
alienated, should the beneficial interest of the public be protected.  In my opinion, this is a flaw in 
his argument, as res omnium communes clearly indicates "things common to all".  Use could be 
restricted, but res communes could not be permanently alienated.  Hannig 1983 Santa Clara L 
Rev 211 supports Coquillette's view that conceptual support for the public trust doctrine is to be 
found in a property notion. 
57 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 484; Casey 1984 Nat Resources J 812.  In the Arnold case 78, New 
Jersey's Chief Justice stated that a grant purporting to divest citizens of their common rights in 
navigable rivers would be a grievance "which never could be long borne by a free people". 
58 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 484. 
59 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 485. 
60 Von Tigerstrom 1998 J Env L & P 382. 
61 This is illustrated by the remark of the court in the Illinois Central case 436, that the doctrine is 
founded upon the necessity of preserving the use of navigable waters from private interruption 
and encroachment to the public.  All three underlying theories find application in this reasoning. 
62 Olson 1975 Det CLR 178. 
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public trust law, the Illinois Central case.63  He points out that the Illinois Central case 
explicitly noted that submerged lands were just one example of public trust 
resources64 and that the court allowed for future development by stating:65 
 
So with trusts connected with public property, or property of a special 
character like lands under navigable waters, they cannot be entirely beyond 
the direction and control of the state.  [own emphasis] 
 
Recognising that public rights' protection was thus being accorded not only to 
traditional trust objects, but also to "other areas of special public importance farther 
inland",66 Olson analysed the courts' ratio decidendi, which is binding on courts in 
lower jurisdictions owing to the application of the stare decisis rule.  He wished to 
find an underlying principle that would indicate the extent to which the doctrine could 
be expanded.67  The common principle he found in all the cases he referred to is 
aptly encapsulated in the following citation:68  
 
The public trust doctrine – like all common law principles – should not be 
considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet 
changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit. 
 
The area of application of the doctrine could be expanded in terms of the same 
principle that governed the first expansion from tidewaters to navigable waters.69  
This illustrates that law in a democratic society reflects society's values.  Although it 
was established that the range of public purposes protected by the trust is dictated 
by the "public need for continued protection of a public benefit related and attached 
to the land",70 the parameters of the "public need" were not finally determined by the 
                                                     
63 Illinois Central case. 
64 Olson 1975 Det CLR 179. 
65 Illinois Central case 454. 
66 Olson 1975 Det CLR 177 specifically refers to the protection given to natural resources by 
legislation. 
67 Olson 1975 Det CLR 179–183.  Wilkinson 1989 Envtl L 427 is one of many commentators who 
indicate that different courts have extended the public trust doctrine to many kinds of resources. 
68 Borough of Neptune City v Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea 61 NJ 296 (1972) 309. 
69 A more subtle approach than Cohen's proposition 1970 ULR was followed in expanding the 
doctrine. 
70 Olson 1975 Det CLR 182.  Dunphy 1976 Marq L Rev 794 indicates that even the definition of 
"navigability" has been proved sufficiently flexible to accommodate the changing needs of the 
public and contributed to the expansion of the application of the public trust doctrine.  Stevens 
1980 UC Davis LR 196 supports this assertion and Hannig 1983 Santa Clara L Rev indicates 
that the redefining of "navigable water" was one of the methods used to expand the public trust 
doctrine.  Manzanetti 1984 Pac LJ 1309 also refers to the fact that the development indicated 
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different decisions to which Olson referred.  He believed that the concept appeared 
to be sufficiently broad to fit prima facie showings of public need through past use 
and activities, as well as current legislative declarations of intent concerning natural 
resources.71  Because the public's needs were regarded as an important factor in 
determining the interests and uses protected under the trust, American case law 
states that "the servitude of public interest depends rather upon the purpose for 
which the public requires the use of its streams, than upon any particular mode of 
use".72 
 
This reasoning resulted in the extension of trust protection to public uses including 
sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing and skating.73  It also resulted in the 
recognition that one of the most important public requirements relating to tidelands is 
the preservation of these lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as 
ecological units, inter alia, for scientific studies, as open spaces, and as 
environments that provide food and habitat for birds and marine life and affect the 
scenery and climate of areas.74  In 2005, the Supreme Court of Michigan held 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that the uses that the state must protect are defined by the "ebb and flow" of "changing public 
needs". 
71 Olson 1975 Det CLR 183.  The truth of his assertion is proved by continued expansion of the 
doctrine, despite criticism that it had outlived its purpose.  Bader 1994 Hamline LR 53 states that 
the public trust doctrine is not a "fixed or static" concept, but rather that it is dynamic, meeting the 
changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.  Turnipseed et al 2009 
ELQ 12 confirm that the doctrine has "steadily evolved to fit the perceived needs of society". 
72 Moore v Sanborne 2 Mich 519 (1853) 525 as cited by Stevens 1980 UC Davis LR 221.  Walston 
1982 Santa Clara L Rev 81 explains that the function of the public trust doctrine is to ensure that 
the people retain a sovereign interest in their water resources so that they can adapt their 
resources to changing public needs.  This view is in conformity with the development that has 
taken place. 
73 Caminiti v Boyle 107 Wn 2d 662 (1987) 669; Washington State Geoduck Harvest Association v 
Washington State Department of Natural Resources 124 Wn App 441 (2004) 448.  The doctrine 
has been applied in New Jersey to ensure access by the public to areas of the beach – The 
Times of Trenton Publishing Corporation v Lafayette Yard Community Development Corporation 
183 NJ 519 (2005) 532.  The Supreme Court of New York, New York County, held on 1 
September 2005 in Landmark West!, Board of Managers of the Parc Vendome Condominium v 
City of New York and New York City Economic Development Corporation 2005 NY Slip Op 
25362 Part v that the public trust doctrine has no application with reference to buildings, as the 
doctrine historically applied to natural resources.  
74 Stevens 1980 UC Davis LR 221, 222.  Walston 1982 Santa Clara L Rev 66 supports this view 
and states that the trust is a dynamic rather than a static concept and appears destined to 
expand with the development and recognition of new public uses.  Hannig 1983 Santa Clara L 
Rev 226; Manzanetti 1984 Pac LJ 1308.  Lazarus 1986 Iowa L Rev 652 states that because of 
the flexibility of the doctrine, "highways, driving ranges and shopping malls have passed the 
public muster".  Bader 1992 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 755 attributes the extension of the doctrine by 
the courts to the courts beginning to realise the importance of certain natural resources in 
sustaining the human species.  Thereby, the anthropo-solipsistic nature of the doctrine was 
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through Corrigan J that traditional public rights under the public trust doctrine can be 
protected only by simultaneously safeguarding activities inherent in the exercise of 
those rights.75  Stevens76 indicates that the development of oil and other mineral 
resources discovered under tidelands also emerged as a public trust use in response 
to the felt necessities of the twentieth century. 
 
In National Audubon Society v Superior Court of Alpine County,77 the court 
expanded the reach of the doctrine to non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters, 
in which government-approved conduct on the tributaries affected the public trust 
values in the protected water source.  This development is consistent with public 
trust reasoning because it would be illogical to expect the court, as watchdog, to 
ensure that public trust values are protected by focusing only on the resource itself 
but not on the surrounding circumstances that impact on and influence the status of 
that resource.  A year later, in 1984, the Supreme Court of Montana decided that the 
navigability of water was immaterial in determining whether the state held waters in 
trust for the public.78  In 2004, a decision to the same effect was made by the 
Supreme Court of South Dakota in Parks v Cooper.79  However, this development 
did not take place in all the states.  In 1990, the Supreme Court of Kansas concluded 
that a non-navigable body of water overlying private beds was not subject to the 
public trust.80  This diversity in approach emphasises the uniqueness of the 
application of the doctrine in the different states.  It is apparent that expansive 
                                                                                                                                                                     
recognised.  See also Pearson 2004 J Land Resources & Envtl L 174 and Connolly 2009 BC 
Envtl Aff L Rev 148, 150. 
75 It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Michigan confirmed in 2005 in the Glass case 
674 and 698 that the right to walk along a sea or lakeshore is inherent in the exercise of 
traditionally protected public rights of fishing, hunting and navigation.  This principle was also 
confirmed in Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v Atlantis Beach Club, Inc 185 NJ 40 (2005) 46–
54, in which the court stated: "It follows then, that use of the dry sand has long been a correlate 
to use of the ocean and is a component part of the rights associated with the public trust 
doctrine." 
76 Stevens 1980 UC Davis LR 223.  Walston 1982 Santa Clara L Rev 70 also refers to this 
extension of the public trust corpus.  The principle to be extrapolated is that navigation will not 
always be regarded as the most important public use.  Commerce can effectively compete with it.  
See also Lazarus 1986 Iowa L Rev 649–650, in which it is pointed out that a historical battlefield, 
archaeological remains, a downtown area and all natural resources, including air and water, are 
regarded by different courts as being protected by the public trust doctrine. 
77  658 P 2d 709 (Cal 1983) – hereafter National Audubon Society.  
78 Montana Coalition for Stream Access Inc v Curran 682 P 2d 163 (Mont 1984). 
79 Parks v Cooper 676 NW 2d 823 (SD 2004). 
80 Kansas ex rel Meek v Hays 785 P 2d 1356 (Kan 1990). 
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developments of the public trust doctrine had occurred and in all likelihood will occur 
in state courts.81 
 
The development that took place in individual states illustrates the evolutionary 
character of the law.82  Dunning,83 however, returns our attention to the historical 
classification of the resources covered by the doctrine.  He emphasises that the two 
most important characteristics that a resource must possess before it can be 
regarded as protected by the doctrine are scarcity and natural suitability for common 
use:  "Common use by the general population serves as the basis to characterise 
these natural resources as common heritage or public trust assets."84 
 
The sovereign's responsibility lies within this parameter as the government has an 
obligation to preserve the people's historic freedom of access.  This, argues 
Dunning,85 is what justifies the demand that the state recognise a public property 
right and that the courts limit legislative abolition or modification of that property right. 
 
The initial aim of using the public trust doctrine as a device for ensuring that valuable 
government-controlled resources are not diverted to the sole benefit of private profit 
seekers86 has exploded into an all-embracing environmental protection mechanism.  
In cases in which the traditional doctrine evolved to protect common rights of access 
for commercial purposes, the modern public trust doctrine proclaims conservationist 
principles.  It is this expansion of the doctrine to cover property not previously 
subsumed by the doctrine that elicits criticism. 
 
2.2.1.3 Criticism against the modern public trust doctrine 
 
Huffman87 criticises the public trust doctrine for making it possible for the judiciary to 
intervene and annihilate government action.  He argues that the doctrine undermined 
                                                     
81 Smith and Sweeney 2006 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 334. 
82 Reed 1986 J Env L & P 107. 
83 Dunning 1989 Envtl L 517. 
84 Dunning 1989 Envtl L 522. 
85 Dunning 1989 Envtl L 522; Maguire 1997 J Env L & P 11. 
86 Sax 1970 Mich L Rev 537; Casey 1984 Nat Resources J 812. 
87 Huffman 1986 Denv U L Rev 582–584. 
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democracy88 and constituted a remedy for the perceived failure of public allocation.89  
Huffman objects to the fact that judicial review under the doctrine has taken over the 
role appropriately played by the political branches of government.  Lazarus90 argues 
that the public trust doctrine rests on legal fictions created to avoid judicially 
perceived limitations or the consequences of existing rules of law.  He describes the 
notions of "sovereign ownership" of certain natural resources and the "duties of the 
sovereign as trustee" of natural resources as "judicially created shorthand methods 
to justify treating differently governmental transactions that involve those 
resources".91 
 
Despite this critique, the public trust doctrine remains part of American 
jurisprudence.  Although the modern public trust doctrine is primarily a creation of 
state courts,92 Sax's work motivated the legislature to take action,93 thus protecting 
the flexibility and vitality of the doctrine because the active management of the 
                                                     
88 Contrary to Huffman, Blumm 1989 Envtl L 580 considers the doctrine "a democratising force by 
(1) preventing monopolisation of trust resources and (2) promoting natural resource decision 
making that involves and is accountable to the public". 
89 Huffman 1986 Denv U L Rev 584. 
90 Lazarus 1986 Iowa L Rev 656. 
91 Lazarus 1986 Iowa L Rev 656. 
92 Reed 1986 J Env L & P 117 and Wilkinson 1989 Envtl L 461 hold the opposite opinion of the 
doctrine, thinking it to be mainly federally and constitutionally imposed.  
93 Blumm 1989 Envtl L 574 aptly states that judges have found "this deeply conservative doctrine in 
state constitutions, state statutes and in the common law".  The Supreme Court of Hawaii 
confirmed in Morimoto and Yamada v Board of Land and Natural Resources State of Hawaii 107 
Haw 296 (2005) 301 that the public trust doctrine has been adopted in Hawaii as a fundamental 
principle of constitutional law.  A XI, S 1 of the Constitution of the State of Hawai'i 1995 provides 
that: 
 
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions 
shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources, including 
land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development and 
utilisation of these resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in 
furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State.  All public natural resources are held in trust 
by the State for the benefit of the people. 
 
 In Florida, the public trust doctrine is incorporated in the Constitution of the State of Florida, 
1968, A X, Ss 11 and 16 (Government of Florida 1968 http://bit.ly/gzVerk).  Stevens 1980 UC 
Davis LR 228, inter alia, indicates that the wording of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, 1874 (Government of Pennsylvania 1874 http://bit.ly/ig90Pd) that reads as follows 
was taken to state a public trust: "Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common 
property of all the people, including generations yet to come.  As trustee of these resources, the 
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people."  His view is 
shared by Ryan 2001 Envtl L 477.  Hannig 1983 Santa Clara L Rev 215 identifies constitutional 
and statutory provisions as a source whereby the public trust is expanded. 
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corpus of the trust remains the responsibility of the elected representatives of the 
public.94 
 
2.3  Infringement of vested private property rights 
 
The public trust doctrine interferes with private property rights.  In American 
jurisprudence, it has been asked whether the Fifth Amendment95 can be regarded as 
a limitation on the public trust doctrine.  The principal problem is the extent to which 
the public trust doctrine can eliminate property rights without Fifth Amendment 
compensation.96  Should a vested right be reduced or extinguished because of 
incompatibility with public trust uses, the question is whether the deprived person is 
entitled to be compensated for the loss.97  It is on this specific aspect that the 
expansion of the doctrine to new fields not historically germane to the doctrine 
provokes the most criticism.98  Callies and Breemer99 correctly state that the 
expansion of the doctrine has precipitated a collision between the newfound rights of 
the public under the modern public trust doctrine and private rights traditionally 
flowing from private property.  In evaluating the effect of the public trust doctrine on 
any given resource, it should, however, be kept in mind that the doctrine does by no 
means permit every use of trust lands and waters;100 neither does the status of 
trustee permit the state, through any of its branches of government, to secure to 
itself property rights held by private owners.101 It is only limited public rights that are 
protected.102  
 
In order to contextualise the extent to which the doctrine interferes with private 
property rights, it is necessary to cast a bird's eye view over relevant aspects of 
American takings law. 
                                                     
94 Dunphy 1976 Marq L Rev 802. 
95  Constitution of the United States of America, 1787. 
96 Callies and Breemer 2002 Val U LR 355. 
97 This question is relevant in the South African mining dispensation context. 
98 Huffman 1989 Envtl L 554 states that whilst the doctrine was historically focused on protecting 
individual liberties from the abuses of monarchical power, the doctrine is today employed to limit 
the acquisition and exercise of private rights, inter alia, in water and water-related resources, 
often through the abuse of sovereign power. 
99 Callies and Breemer 2002 Val U LR 357. 
100 Glass case 698. 
101 Glass case 694. 
102 Glass case 698. 
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2.3.1 The takings analysis103 
 
In American jurisprudence, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents the 
government from taking "private property … for public use without just 
compensation".  However, a "taking" need not arise from an actual physical 
occupation of land by the government.  The Supreme Court has held that "if a 
regulation goes too far it will be recognised as a taking".104  In order to prove a 
compensable taking not arising from the physical appropriation or occupation of 
private property, the Penn Central case analysis applies.  The American Supreme 
Court set out a three-part analysis in the Penn Central case to determine whether a 
compensable taking has occurred.  The main factors that provide the framework for 
the analysis are: (a) the character of government action; (b) the economic impact of 
the action on the claimant; and (c) the extent to which the action interfered with the 
claimant's reasonable investment-backed expectations.  The court stressed that the 
focus must be on the "parcel as a whole" 105 and that each case should be judged on 
its own facts106 when conducting the takings analysis.  It is made clear in Lucas v 
South Carolina107 that for purposes of the takings analysis, the title one takes to 
property is subject to the background principles of state law.  In the Lucas case, the 
Supreme Court stated that the government need not compensate the property owner 
should the regulated or prohibited use not have been "part of his title to begin 
with".108  This perspective should be kept in mind when the issue of the extent to 
which the application of the doctrine interferes with private property rights is 
evaluated. 
 
2.3.2  Perspectives from practice 
 
                                                     
103 For a thorough exposition of the US federal constitutional property clause, see Van der Walt  
Constitutional Property Clause 398–458. 
104 Penn Central Transportation Company v New York City 438 US 104 (1978) 124 – hereafter Penn 
Central. 
105 Penn Central case 130–131. 
106 Penn Central case 124. 
107 505 US 1003 (1992) – hereafter Lucas. 
108 Lucas case 1027. 
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In the National Audubon Society case, the public trust doctrine was formulated to 
allow the state to reconsider109 water allocation decisions that permitted harm to 
come to the corpus of the trust, even though the initial allocation decisions were 
made after due consideration of their effect on the public trust.  The purpose of the 
modern trust doctrine was defined by the court as follows:110 
 
The public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public 
property for public purposes.  It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to 
protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and 
tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the 
abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust. 
 
The court confirmed that the public trust doctrine preserves the continuing sovereign 
power of the state to protect uses for water deemed to be in the public interest, as 
there are no "vested rights" in trust property.111  Although the decision in this case 
was merely advisory because no vested rights had been affected directly, the 
California Supreme Court suggested that it would reject a claim that these reductions 
constitute takings for which compensation is required, as no one is divested of any 
title to property.  However, this could result in the total annihilation of owners' rights 
towards their property or exclude current right holders.112   
 
The Washington Supreme Court expressed a similar opinion in Orion Corporation v 
State of Washington.113  The Court held that the public trust precludes a 
constitutional claim for taking without compensation because title to trust resources 
is acquired subject to whatever state action may be deemed necessary to protect the 
public's interest in the trust resources.114  
 
                                                     
109 According to Manzanetti 1984 Pac LJ 1291, this power to reconsider vested water rights was a 
new facet to the public trust doctrine.  However, Casey 1984 Nat Resources J 815 states that the 
principles set forth in the Illinois Central case decision illustrated that the power of the state in 
administering the trust resource extended to revocation of previously granted rights and the 
"enforcement of the trust against resources long thought free of the trust". 
110 National Audubon Society case 558–559. 
111 National Audubon Society case 447.  Arnold and Jewel 2008 Hastings W-Nw J Envt'l L & Pol'y 
1190. 
112 National Audubon Society case 440. 
113 747 P 2d 1062 (Wash 1987) – hereafter Orion Corporation. 
114 Orion Corporation case 1081–1082. 
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Perhaps the most far-reaching extension of the public trust doctrine is illustrated by 
the Hawaiian case In re Water Use Permit Applications.115  Here, the court imposed 
a broad version of the doctrine onto the state's fresh water supply, thereby rewriting 
Hawaii's legislative water code.  The court held that "resource protection" was a 
protected public trust use of such resources.  In response to a taking objection, the 
court stated:116 
 
[T]he reserved sovereign prerogatives over the waters of the state precludes 
the assertion of vested rights to water contrary to public trust purposes.  This 
restriction preceded the formation of property rights in this jurisdiction; in 
other words, the right to absolute ownership of water exclusive of the public 
trust never accompanied the 'bundle of rights' conferred … 
 
Manzanetti117 indicates that the public trust doctrine avoids the takings issue by 
claiming a pre-existing title118 in the property in favour of the state.  He argues that 
the compensation requirement may be dispensed with only if the property holder had 
actual or constructive prior notice that the state was obliged to protect public trust 
uses.119  Manzanetti continues by stating that the doctrine would be applicable as a 
means of avoiding the compensation requirement only if it could be shown that the 
right holder had prior notice of expectations by the public that are incompatible with 
                                                     
115 9 P 3d 409 (Hawa 2000) – hereafter Water Use Permit Applications. 
116 Water Use Permit Applications case 494. 
117 Manzanetti 1984 Pac LJ 1305.  This view is shared by Bader 1994 Hamline LR 54, who contends 
that explicit notice of the public trust interest in land is not necessary and is assumed to run with 
trust resources from the moment of statehood.  His view does not explain the inclusion of non-
traditional resources within the scope of the doctrine.  See also Grant 1995 Ariz St LJ 427. 
118 Manzanetti 1984 Pac LJ 1306 explains that according to the theory of pre-existing title, the state 
has always had a title in the property.  Property holders should therefore have known that the 
state had pre-existing title when they acquired their property; and when the state acts to reassert 
title to the detriment of the property holder, compensation is not required.  The need for 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment is obviated by the prior knowledge of the pre-existing 
title.  The reason for this contention is that should the property holder have had notice of the pre-
existing title in the state, the reassertion of the rights in the title would have caused neither a 
change in the law, nor a change in the structural rules under which the property holder was to 
make choices regarding expectations in his property rights.  Should, however, announcement by 
the state that a pre-existing title clouded the property holder's title constitute "a sudden change in 
state law, unpredicted in terms of relevant precedents", government action pursuant to that 
announcement would constitute a deprivation of property for which compensation is required.  
Lazarus 1986 Iowa L Rev 673 supports Manzanetti's argument that parties who engage in 
economic activities in an area that they know is of public concern and regulated by government 
are on notice that the government may regulate in the future.  For that reason, they cannot 
complain when their investments are adversely affected by subsequent regulations. 
119 Manzanetti 1984 Pac LJ 1307.  Grant 1995 Ariz St LJ 427 confirms that an owner is entitled to 
compensation if the government action "goes beyond what the relevant background principles 
would dictate". 
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his expectations regarding his right as owner or holder.120  He researched the 
development of the scope of the public trust doctrine and confirmed that although the 
uses protected by the public trust remained linked to navigation, commerce and 
fishing for several decades, the "changing public needs" dictated the extension of 
such protection.  He contends that the retroactive application of this expanded 
definition of the public trust in derogation of exercised property rights constituted a 
taking requiring compensation.121  Determining the existence of prior notice would 
remain a factual question to be answered in every individual case. 
 
Manzanetti's line of reasoning was echoed in the US Supreme Court's decision of 
the Phillips Petroleum Company case.122  The court found that: 
 
The fact that certain private claimants have long been the record title holders 
of lands in the state of Mississippi that lie under nonnavigable waters, or that 
such claimants have long paid taxes on such lands, does not divest the state 
of its ownership of those lands under the public trust given to the state upon 
its entry into the Union … the state's ownership of those lands could not be 
lost via adverse possession, laches, or any other equitable doctrine.123 
 
The importance of the decision of the National Audubon Society case is the 
government's greater reliance on the public trust doctrine as a tool to expand 
sovereign authority and enhance state enforcement efforts over natural resources 
covered by the doctrine.124  A natural result of the expansion of the doctrine that 
compromises previously privately held property is the blurring of traditional 
boundaries between public and private property.125 
                                                     
120 Manzanetti 1984 Pac LJ 1296.  See also Blumm 1989 Envtl L 586.  Neither Manzanetti nor 
Blumm refers to the majority opinion of  Field J in the Illinois Central case 455, in which he 
expressed the opinion that in a case in which a state resumes control over previously granted 
trust resources, the state "ought to pay" for any "expenses incurred in improvements made under 
such a grant".  Rasband 1998 U Colo L Rev 333 argues that this remark indicates that although 
the state exercise of a public easement might not require just compensation under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, it may merit some compensation as a matter of equity.  He relies on 
"mistaken improver law", a concept dealt with in South Africa under enrichment law, and argues 
that equitable compensation should be regarded as being an essential element of the public trust 
doctrine. 
121 Manzanetti 1984 Pac LJ 1310.  He is supported by Huffman 1989 Envtl L 559, who contends that 
by expanding the scope of public trust rights, the state will expand its ability to regulate beyond 
the constraints of the Constitution and evade the taking limits on police power. 
122 481–485. 
123 Dissenting judges argued that this finding broke a chain of title of more than 150 years.  They 
thought that settled expectations of landowners would be disrupted. 
124 Lazarus 1986 Iowa L Rev 655. 
125 Searle 1990 SC L Rev 916. 
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Reed126 warns that the public trust doctrine should not be regarded as creating a 
reversionary right by which the public can reclaim trust property long lost.  In cases 
in which the public uses secured by the doctrine are lost for any significant period of 
time, the doctrine should cease to apply.  He emphasises the importance of the law's 
interest in the stability of land title and argues that the "re-emergence of an ancient 
doctrine should not be allowed to upset titles created and relied upon previous to the 
doctrine's rediscovery".127 
 
2.3.3 Impairment of the public trust and limitation on government activities 
 
The limitations placed on government's activities, strictly speaking, determine the 
scope of the public trust doctrine.  The state is regarded as the trustee of property 
impressed with the public trust doctrine, and the legislature is charged with the task 
of managing the trust.128  As such, an affirmative duty is imposed on the legislature 
to act in all circumstances in which action is necessary, be it to preserve or promote 
that which is held in trust.129  The judiciary is to act as a watchdog of the trust, and 
existing precedents have indicated that the judiciary would go beyond form to 
substance to ensure that the legislative authority fulfils its duty in administering the 
trust.130  
 
The broadest parameter of the public trust doctrine, therefore, has its origin in the 
state's valid exercise of the police power and the power of eminent domain in the 
reallocation and disposition of natural resources.131  The public trust doctrine is also 
an additional limitation on the exercise of the police power and the power of eminent 
domain in relation to the reallocation of natural resources.  In a sense, this doctrine 
expands the exercise of police power because stricter regulation may be required to 
                                                     
126 Reed 1986 J Env L & P 118. 
127 Reed 1986 J Env L & P 119. 
128 Dunphy 1976 Marq L Rev 796. 
129 Dunphy 1976 Marq L Rev 797; Blumm 1989 Envtl L 585.  
130 Dunphy 1976 Marq L Rev 798.  Stevens 1980 UC Davis LR 217 supports this contention and 
states that the courts would not be bound by patently inaccurate declarations of public purpose 
for legislation having as its goal the destruction of public waters for private profit.  This role suits 
the judiciary well, for as Pearson 2004 J Land Resources & Envtl L 173 remarks:  "While the 
doctrine can originate in constitutional or statutory law, typically its genesis is judicial decision".  
See also Turnipseed  et al 2009 ELQ 56. 
131 Olson 1975 Det CLR 164. 
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safeguard the use of the resource by the public.132  Bader133 appropriately states that 
"unlike most property, real estate containing public trust resources is subject to far 
more restrictive regulation in its use than other private lands".  This stems from the 
unique value trust resources have to society as a whole.  
 
However, the view that the doctrine is a source of authority for state regulation is 
viewed by some commentators as a distortion of the historical purpose of the public 
trust doctrine:  
 
The problem with the equation of public trust and police power is that the 
public trust doctrine purports to be the basis of a rights claim rather than a 
source of governmental power.  Because public trust rights are understood 
to predate other property rights, their status in relation to those rights claims 
is always prior in time, and therefore, superior in right.  There can be no 
claim that enforcement of public trust right results in a taking because 
individual property rights are by definition subject to the prior public rights.134 
 
The public trust doctrine simultaneously provides a basis for the state to retain 
continuing jurisdiction over the trust corpus so that continuing choices dictated by the 
public need can be made.135  However, the power of eminent domain may be limited 
in cases in which a public trust is shown to be present in the resource, as the taking 
needs to be proved consistent with the public's right to use the resource.  
 
Five elements have been identified on the basis of case law as the criteria that must 
be applied when the factual determination of justified impairment of the trust corpus 
is to be made.136  The application of the following five basic concepts will indicate the 
extent and validity of the impairment: 
 
(a) some retention of governmental control; 
                                                     
132 Lazarus 1986 Iowa L Rev 655 states that developments in the public trust arena in the early 
1980s were confined to suits in which the private citizen was the plaintiff asserting the doctrine 
and the government was the unwilling defendant resisting the trust's application.  Government 
argued that the public trust doctrine expands sovereign authority over natural resources covered 
by the doctrine, limiting the nature of valid private property rights in those resources whilst 
rendering permissible governmental measures that impinge on those private interests.  
133 Bader 1994 Hamline LR 54. 
134 Huffman 1989 Envtl L 558. 
135 With reference to the allocation of water rights, Walston 1982 Santa Clara L Rev 64, 85 states 
that the public trust doctrine enables the state to allocate and, if necessary, reallocate its water 
supply for the protection of important public interests. 
136 Olson 1975 Det CLR 184; Williams 2002 SC Envtl LJ 42. 
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(b) continued public use and availability; 
(c) relative diminution of size; 
(d) non-interference with past or existing public uses; and 
(e) a subjective test of public reaction to the new or proposed use. 
 
In instances in which proposed dealings with trust resources are being evaluated, 
these five elements will indicate whether the proposed action honours public trust 
values.  In cases in which courts have to resolve conflict between public trust use 
rights and other current or future uses of trust resources by private landowners and 
public entities, a similar but extended balancing test has been proposed.137  This test 
also consists of five weighted factors: 
 
                                                     
137 Hannig 1983 Santa Clara L Rev 232–236. 
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(a) current public trust uses should be accorded the greatest weight; 
(b) potential public trust uses should be considered; 
(c) compatibility of new uses with public trust rights should be investigated; 
(d) the reasonable expectations of all concerned parties and the public should be 
considered; and 
(e) whether appropriation or private use of trust property would constitute a 
significant diminution in the amount of land or water locally available upon which 
the public could exercise its trust rights should be considered. 
 
Hannig138 concedes that this test might be a more equitable test for resolving 
conflicts between public and private uses of trust lands. 
 
2.4 Classification of the modern public trust doctrine 
 
There appears to be no unanimity on the nature of the modern public trust doctrine.  
American courts have treated the doctrine largely as a public property right of access 
to certain public trust resources for various public purposes.139   It can thus be 
described as a public easement140 or servitude.141   
 
Whilst no suggestion can be found that the traditional public trust doctrine had any 
relation with constitutional law,142 the codification and reception of the doctrine into 
state constitutions and statutes warrant a present-day classification of the doctrine 
as constitutional law in relevant circumstances.143  In cases in which the doctrine is 
applicable only as a common-law doctrine and was judicially expanded, it will be 
difficult to classify it under constitutional law.  Although the doctrine originated from 
the common law, it can be viewed today as a body of legal thought incorporating 
both common and statutory law protecting natural resources. 
 
3 Conclusion 
                                                     
138 Hannig 1983 Santa Clara L Rev 232–236. 
139 Blumm 1989 Envtl L 581; Dunning 1989 Envtl L 519.  Scott 1998 Fordham Envtl LJ 15 describes 
the basic doctrine in its simplest sense as a principle of sovereignty. 
140 Blumm 1989 Envtl L 580. 
141 Wilkinson 1989 Envtl L 450; Huffman 1989 Envtl L 527; Dunning 1989 Envtl L 515. 
142 Huffman 1989 Envtl L 545–555. 
143 See Government of Florida 1968 http://bit.ly/gzVerk and Government of Pennsylvania 1874 
http://bit.ly/ig90Pd. 
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The article aimed to give a thorough theoretical exposition of the development and 
application of the public trust doctrine in American jurisprudence in order to provide 
the South African scholar with a perspective on a legal construct founded on the 
philosophical notion that governments merely exercise a "fiduciary trust" on behalf of 
their people.  As it falls outside the scope of the article to compare the American 
public trust doctrine with the concept of "public trusteeship" as it is embodied in 
South African legislation (a comparison that could be made only after more legal 
constructs founded on the same line of thought have been researched), I conclude 
with a summary of the doctrine as it finds application in American jurisprudence. 
 
The contemporary American public trust doctrine can be characterised as a public 
right in property.  As against a private easement or servitude, it can be described as 
a public servitude.  Through the application of the doctrine, certain rights vest in the 
citizens of America as an entity, but American citizens can demand the realisation 
and protection of that interest as individuals.  The government is compelled to deal 
with the objects that are regarded as public trust property in such a way that the 
public's right in that property is promoted and enhanced.  Simultaneously, the 
government must refrain from actions that would negate the interest of the public in 
the trust property.  The government's ability to deal freely with public trust property is 
thus definitely curtailed by the purpose of the public trust and restricted to 
custodianship or guardianship of the relevant property. 
 
Individuals' rights in public trust property are likewise curtailed.  No individual can 
attain unrestricted private title in public trust property, as the property is bound by the 
public easement.  Individuals must, however, ensure that their rights in public trust 
property are realised.  As the judiciary is the watchdog of the public trust with the 
power to annihilate government actions that go against the aim and purpose of the 
public trust, individuals must not refrain from insisting on protection in instances in 
which the need arises. 
 
The concept of a "public trust" should not be confused with the concept of "public 
interest".  "Public interest" is a broad concept and basically every action that has 
public value or generates economic gain is in the public interest.  The term "public 
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trust" refers to matters of common property that are held in trust by the state for the 
use and benefit of present and future generations of citizens.  There is a nuanced 
difference between protecting public uses and "ensuring that environmental 
resources are beneficially used in the public interest".  As indicated above, property 
subject to the trust may not be used for any and every public purpose.  The property 
must be held available for use by the public, but it must be maintained for certain 
types of uses, which include traditional uses or uses that are in some sense related 
to or compatible with the natural uses peculiar to that resource. 
 
The public trust doctrine is a common-law doctrine of American jurisprudence.  Its 
field of application can be and has been expanded according to public need.  The 
expansion of both the geographical scope of the doctrine and the range of interests 
protected by the doctrine is a result of the recognition that "public need" dictates the 
direction of growth, as in any other field of the law.  The possibility of conflict 
generated by the expansion of the doctrine is inevitable.  In a society in which the 
divide between rich and poor is constantly growing, in an overpopulated world in 
which the most needy have already lost the race for the use of resources, the public 
trust doctrine is a mechanism that guards against the exploitation of a country's 
natural treasures. 
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